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In April 2001, Japan took its first step in implementing provisional safeguard measures under the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards against imports of Welsh onions, Shiitake mushrooms and Tatami mats. With 
certain exceptions, Japan has rarely resorted to such aggressive measures to this day, while subject to 
protectionist measures taken by other WTO member countries. The specific exceptions include the 
implementation of special safeguard (SSG) measures under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. These 
measures may only be implemented against imports of agricultural products tariffied under the scope of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. Japan has implemented the SSG measures 47 times so far against 
imports of rice, butter, milk, starch and other products (Table 1).   
TABLE 1 
Special Safeguard (SSG) Actions Taken by Japan after the Establishment of the WTO 
 Number  of 
SSG actions taken 
Targeted products 
1995  3  Starches, Whey, Milk powder 
1996  5  Raw silk, Inulin, Milk powder, Buttermilk, Azuki Beans 
1997  6  Meat of Swine, Raw silk, Evaporated milk, Inulin, Condensed 
milk, Milk and cream 
1998 2  Condensed  milk,  Inulin 
1999  6  Food preparations (containing natural milk), Wheat starch, 
Condensed milk, Starches, Milk powder, Inulin 
2000 8  Peas, Food preparations (containing natural milk), Starches, 
Wheat flour, Butter, Inulin 
2001  7  Buttermilk, Food preparations of flour, meal or starch, Other 
fats and oils derived from milk, Milk and cream, Manioc starch 
2002  4  Buttermilk, Rice, Rice flour, Wheat preparation 
2003  3  Beans, Food preparations containing starch 
2004  3  Butter, Inulin, Corn starch   
Total 47   
Source: Author’s compilation from notifications (G/AG/N/JPN/*) to WTO by Japan as of April 30, 
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The Agreement on Agriculture’s SSG unlike the Agreement on Safeguards does not require 
member countries to demonstrate the existence of a causal link between increased imports of the 
product concerned and a serious injury to the domestic industry
2 or to disclose detailed results from 
relevant investigations.
3  Thus, while SSG measures were relatively easy to implement, the Government 
of Japan did not necessarily actively disclose such information to the public.   
As seen above, it can be said that although Japan had frequently implemented SSG measures, it 
is one of the major industrialized countries with relatively little or no experience in implementing other 
measures (Table 1).   
TABLE 1 
Trade Policy Measures Taken by Major Countries after the Establishment of the WTO 
 US  EU  Canada Australia  Japan 
Investigation 
initiated  11 2 1 1 1 
Provisional 
measures  0200  1  
Safeguard measures under the 
Agreement on Safeguards 
 (-Dec.  2003) 
Definitive 
measures  6100  0  
Anti-Dumping measures 
 (-Dec.  2002) 
Investigation 
initiated  292 267 107 155 2 
Countervailing Duty 
 (-Jun.  2002) 
Investigation 
initiated  1 2 05 82 41 3  0  
Transitional Safeguards 
(TSG) under the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing 
 (-Dec.  2002) 
Invocation 26 0 0 0  0 
Source: METI (2004). 
For example, the number of safeguard and anti-dumping measures implemented by Japan is 
limited compared to other member countries. Moreover, Japan has never resorted to Countervailing 
Duties or Transitional Safeguard (TSG) measures under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. The 
reasons for this include that: (1) Japan progressively liberalized products depending on their 
                                                   
2  Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards. 





4  (2) Japan has responded with SSG measures in dealing with agricultural 
products tariffied as a consequence of the Uruguay Round negotiations; and (3) agricultural products 
that were either tariffied or liberalized before the Uruguay Round negotiations included fresh foodstuffs 
that could not be readily traded due to constraints in transportation and preservation technologies.
5 
However, due to innovations in food transportation and preservation technologies and progress 
in “develop-and-import schemes” (kaihatsu yunyu) in the agricultural business in Asian countries, a 
gradual increase in the number and variety of fresh agricultural imports is evident. There is no doubt 
that such changes in the trade environment had an impact on the increased imports of these products 
subject to the provisional safeguard measures in 2001. 
Incidentally, most of the trade issues covered by the Japanese media heretofore relate to either 
Japan’s import liberalization or protectionist measures taken against Japan by other countries. Therefore, 
while provisional in nature, the safeguard measures implemented by Japan for the first time drew great 
media attention, and furthermore helped raise the awareness of both consumers and importers regarding 
the negative impacts of “raising tariffs”. Moreover, as China’s retaliation against Japan’s safeguard 
measures caused further complications, a succession of events in 2001 also provided an opportunity for 
heated domestic discussions for the first time ever on questions such as “What is the national interest in 
trade policy?” and “How should we seek to strike a balance between the promotion of free trade and the 
protection of domestic industries?” 
This paper seeks to first sort out the economic and political economy implications of the 
implementation of the safeguard measures, then to review and evaluate the provisional safeguard 
measures implemented by Japan in 2001 and the retaliatory measures taken by China against Japan, and 
                                                   
4 Komuro (2001, p. 915). Moreover, it should be mentioned that Japan bypassed safeguard measures for some 
sensitive items, such as textile products, by having supplying countries take grey-area measures, especially before 
the establishment of WTO. Ibid p.918. 
5 The third factor is based on a speech given by Tamotsu Takase at the Research Institute of Aoyama Gakuin 




finally to consider the institutional issues and recommendations for the direction Japan should take in 
future trade remedy measures.   
2. THEORETICAL RATIONALES FOR SAFEGUARD MEASURES 
In this essay, the theoretical rationale for the implementation of safeguard measures and the existence of 
such rules are discussed from several viewpoints, along with a review of counterarguments against these 
views.  
a. Efficiency (Minimization of Social Adjustment Costs) 
According to the static economic model, if trade liberalization brings about an increase in imports in an 
economy, it is assumed that through the price mechanism labor and capital would eventually be 
optimally reallocated within or between industries. On the other hand, in a more dynamic view of the 
economy, factors of production would not be immediately reallocated in response to a change in the 
market environment. For example, if wage rigidities and other market failures exist, smooth adjustment 
would not be realized, resulting in a decrease in production volume and social adjustment costs, caused 
by the emergence of involuntary unemployment and/or idle capital.
6  Thus, the justification for avoiding 
a sudden increase in imports lies in preventing an undue increase in social adjustment costs and in 
providing a temporary time period for domestic firms and workers to facilitate taking the necessary 
measures for adjustment within or between industries. However, can the safeguards be described as the 
first-best policy for the minimization of social adjustment costs?   
The first-best policy to minimize social adjustment costs is to take domestic measures, such as 
granting subsidies for firms or retraining programs for workers to offset market failures that hamper 
smooth adjustment.
7 Safeguards in the form of tariff increases or quantitative restrictions raise the 
                                                   
6  See, for example, Ito et al. (1988, pp.281-289); and Richardson (1982, p.323). 
7 On the other hand, if these domestic measurers are to effectively function as tools to substitute for safeguard 




prices of imported goods, cause a deterioration of consumer welfare, and can reduce the social welfare 
of a nation as a whole. 
Furthermore, the implementation of safeguards is open to question from the standpoint of 
economic efficiency. First, while the Agreement on Safeguards limits the time period of measures,
8 
there is no guarantee that needed social adjustments will be realized during the period of application. 
There are arguments that once import restrictions are introduced, the protection mechanisms they 
provide tend to become permanent and the implementation of the safeguard measures would inhibit 
self-innovative efforts by firms, thereby impeding progress crucial for necessary adjustment.
9 Second, 
from the standpoint of efficiency and equity, distinguishing the damages caused to domestic firms and 
workers by an “increase in imports” from damages by other factors such as recession or a change in 
consumer preferences, and providing the former with preferential remedies is called into question.
10 
Third, it should not be forgotten that, while the Agreement on Safeguards prohibits retaliation against a 
WTO-consistent safeguard for the first three years that a safeguard measure is in effect, implementation 
of safeguards against a non-member country of the WTO, and implementation of WTO-inconsistent 
safeguards certainly run the risk of retaliation by an exporting country.   
Safeguard measures may thus entail costs of implementation. Notwithstanding this, it has been 
suggested that one of the reasons safeguard measures are implemented instead of domestic measures is 
that in passing on the cost of protection an inefficient industry to foreign firms instead of taxpayers, it is 
be less likely to generate a “sense of inequality” at home, thus limiting political damage to politicians.
11  
                                                                                                                                                                 
as an “emergency” tool in the event of a sharp increase in imports. 
8  Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards. 
9  See, for example, Lapham and Ware (2001) and Kohler and Moore (2001). 
10  Trebilcock and Howse (1999, p. 232). 




b. Political Safety Valve Hypothesis 
While a number of limitations and side effects exist for safeguard measures as a means to prevent 
increased adjustment costs, there is a view that in the long run, the existence and implementation of 
safeguard rules are essential in order to cope with protectionist pressures. Notably, this is an argument 
for a “political safety valve” function inherent in safeguard measures. The argument is that when a 
country faces a sudden increase in imports, and an injured domestic industry begins to feel the burden of 
adjustment costs, the implementation of safeguards serves as a “safety valve” in containing an excessive 
rise in protectionist pressures.
12 In other words, the logic of this argument is that in the absence of a 
safety valve that works through our administrative procedure, it would be impossible for policymakers 
to control the pressure and could thus lead to more stringent protectionist legislation or to the execution 
of “gray area measures” such as a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER). 
Public Choice Perspective 
Sykes (1991) maintains, from the perspective of public choice theory, that the existence of safeguard 
rules has the function of minimizing future political risks that politicians in an importer country face at 
the time of trade negotiations, thus promoting trade liberalization.
13  According to public choice theory, 
the policy-making process in a democratic state does not necessarily guarantee the choice of an efficient 
policy, and politicians are expected to seek to maximize their own interests for the purpose of obtaining 
votes and monetary contributions. For this reason, the theory leads to a conclusion that in trade policy, 
the interests of special interest groups highly capable of lobbying activities and raising contributions 
tend to take precedence over the interests of unorganized entities such as consumers.   
                                                   
12  See, for example, Lawrence and Litan (1986, pp. 23-24) and Jackson et al. (1995, pp. 601-602). 
13  The public choice perspective suggests “a possible tradeoff between protection ex post and trade concessions ex 
ante,” whereas the above-mentioned political safety valve hypothesis maintains that “without the escape clause, 





If safeguard rules did not exist and import-restrictive measures could not be taken even in the 
state of an emergency, politicians of an importing country could very well risk losing their support base 
after liberalizing their domestic market. However, if safeguard measures are available, it is possible for 
politicians to maintain leeway to gain political payoff by protecting an injured domestic industry by 
implementing safeguards even after liberalization.
14  As mentioned above, implementation of safeguards 
entails the risk of retaliation by exporting countries as well as the risk of losing support from domestic 
industries affected by such retaliation. Thus, it would be reasonable for politicians in an importing 
country to implement safeguard measures only when the implementation of the safeguards measures is 
considered to bring a net gain in political payoff for them. 
3. JAPAN’S EXPERIENCE OF IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONAL SAFEGUARDS IN 2001 
As previously noted, in April 2001, Japan implemented provisional safeguard measures under the 
Agreement on Safeguards against imports of Welsh onions, Shiitake mushrooms and Tatami mats, most 
of which were imported from China. As a full investigation and actual implementation of the provisional 
safeguard measures under the Agreement on Safeguards were both firsts for Japan, there was major 
domestic controversy on the pros and cons of such trade measures. This section discusses the 
developments surrounding Japan’s implementation of the provisional safeguard measures, the 
corresponding retaliation by China, and an evaluation of a series of relevant remedies. 
a. Background and Contents of the Safeguard Measures 
On December 22, 2000, the Government of Japan initiated a safeguard investigation according to Article 
9.6 of the Customs Tariff Law (Table 3).
15 Behind the rising momentum for the implementation of the 
                                                   
14  Sykes (1991, pp. 281-282). 
15 Whether to initiate safeguard investigation is determined by the government through interagency consultation 
among Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and any other relevant 




safeguards were first of all, changes in the external environment as described above, that is, the 
innovations in food transportation, preservation technologies, progress in technological transfers, and 
direct investment in agricultural business in Asian countries. As a result of these changes, imports of 
agricultural products formerly unfit for active trade increased, and the demand for protective measures 
from domestic producers increased accordingly. In addition, it should be noted that elections for the Diet 
were scheduled to take place in July 2001. Viewed from the perspective of public choice theory, 
implementation of the safeguard measures appeared to be a perfect opportunity to garner election votes 
for politicians whose main support came from the agricultural sector. In fact, it was stipulated that the 
Research Commission on Trade in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Products of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) was the driving force behind the realization of the provisional safeguard measures.
16 
TABLE 3 
Chronology of Japan’s Provisional Safeguards and Retaliation by China 
2000/12/22  Initiation of investigation by the Government of Japan (GOJ) according to the Customs 
Tariff Law 
2001/3/23  Release of “evidence on the urgent necessity to take provisional safeguard measures” 
4/13  Consultation with China in Beijing (Vice-Minister level) 
4/17  Cabinet decision on “The Cabinet Order Concerning the Imposition of the Provisional 
Emergency Duties on Welsh Onion etc., No. 167”   
4/20 Notification  to  WTO 
4/23  Invocation of provisional safeguard measures (for 200 days) 
6/22  Retaliation by China through imposing special custom duties (100%) on mobile and car 
phones, Air conditioners, and Automobiles imported from Japan 
7/3,4  Consultation with China in Beijing (Director General level)   
7/29  Election for the House of Representatives 
9/24  Consultation with China in Beijing (Director General level) 
10/8  Meeting between Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in 
                                                                                                                                                                 
States is initiated upon petition by a domestic industry. In contrast, investigation for textiles products under the 
SSG scheme may be initiated by METI upon petition from the domestic producers or an association thereof. See 
Komuro (2001, p. 883 and 975). It should be mentioned that in March 2001, MAFF requested METI and MOF to 
initiated safeguard investigation on imports of eels, wakame weeds, lumber in 2001, but the request ended with no 
investigation. See Subcommittee on Special Trade Measures, Industrial Structure Council, “Summary of the 
Minutes (April 13, 2001)” (http://www.meti.go.jp/kohosys/press/0001486/0/010413sankoushin.html). 





  Meeting between Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President Jiang Zemin in 
Shanghai 
10/31  Release of “summary of major index investigated by the government”   
11/1  Consultation with China in Beijing (Director General level) 
11/8  Expiration of Japan’s provisional safeguards 
11/22  Consultation with China in Beijing (Director General level) 
12/11  China officially became a member of WTO 
12/11  Consultation with China in Beijing (Minister level) 
12/19  Consultation with China in Tokyo (Vice-Minister level) 
12/21  Consultation with China in Beijing (Minister level) (Conflict resolved, establishment of 
“Agricultural Products Trade Council” agreed) 
12/21  End of investigation by the GOJ 
12/27  Removal of special custom duties by China 
Source: METI’s web site (http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/safeguard/). 
In March 2001, the government of Japan published “Evidence on the urgent necessity to take 
provisional safeguard measures against imports of Welsh onion, Shiitake mushroom and Tatami mats.” On 
the basis of the preliminary results of the investigation, Japan implemented provisional safeguard measures 
(tariff-rate quotas) for a period of 200 days from April 23, 2001, and adopted the prohibitive secondary tariff 
rate for the three products (Table 4). The LDP won an overwhelming victory in the Upper House election in 
July in the same year, but the victory was generally ascribed to the “(Prime Minister) Koizumi boom.” Thus 
it is highly unlikely that the implementation of the safeguards swayed the overall election outcome.
17 
TABLE 4 
Provisional Safeguard Measures Taken by Japan in April 2001 
Trends in tariff rate   
1996 1998  2000 




Secondary tariff for 
imports above quota 
Welsh onion  4.3% 3.7% 3.0%  3.0% 5,383 (MT) 256.0% 
Shiitake 
mushroom 
4.8% 4.5% 4.3%  4.3% 8,003 (MT) 266.0% 
Tatami mats  6.9% 6.0% 6.0%  6.0% 7,949 (MT) 106.0% 
Source: WTO (G/SG/N/7/JPN/1, G/SG/N/11/JPN/1, 25 April 2001). 
                                                   
17 However, it is well worth noting that the LDP candidates elected had collected the most votes in Chiba 
Prefecture which had the largest number of Welsh onion producers in Japan in 2000, in Gunma Prefecture which 
produced the largest amount of fresh Shiitake mushrooms, and similarly in Kumamoto Prefecture which had the 
largest number of producers of Igusa rush used in Tatami mats. The results of the 2001 Upper House election 




Results of the Investigation by the Government of Japan 
The following is an overview of the market situation for the three products for which Japan 
implemented provisional safeguard measures (Tables 5-7). As shown, imports of the three items clearly 
increased in the five preceding years, with the share of imports in the domestic market rising as well. 
Average domestic prices also declined, and domestic production and shipments also dropped, except for 
Welsh onions. In its notification to the WTO on the basis of results from the government’s investigations, 
the Government concluded that the “increase in imports caused serious damage to domestic industries” 
for all three products.
18 However, it must be noted that the methodology and conclusions of the 
government’s investigations pose several statistical and interpretive problems. 
                                                   





Results of the Investigation by the Government of Japan, Welsh Onions 
 Unit  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
MT 1,504 1,471 6,802 21,197  37,375  Imports (a) 
% change    -2.2% 362.4% 211.6%  76.3% 
MT 415,900 417,300 398,200 401,400  416,600  Domestic Shipping Volume 
(b)  % change    0.3% -4.6% 0.8%  3.8% 
Market share of imported 
onion (a/a+b)  % 0.4% 0.4% 1.7% 5.0%  8.2% 
Total Supply (a+b)    417,404 418,771 405,002 422,597  453,975 
Average price of domestic 
onion  yen/kg 252 278 340 300  222 
Total labor hours  1,000 hours 50,772 46,438 43,244 37,810  34,130 
Source: WTO (G/SG/N/7/JPN/1, G/SG/N/11/JPN/1, 25 April 2001). 
TABLE 6 
Results of the Investigation by the Government of Japan, Shiitake Mushrooms 
  Unit  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
MT 24,394 26,028 31,396 31,628  42,057  Imports (a) 
% change  -7.3% 6.7% 20.6% 0.7%  33.0% 
MT 75,157 74,782 74,217 70,511  67,224  Domestic Shipping Volume 
(b)  % change    -0.5% -0.8% -5.0%  -4.7% 
Market share of imported 
Shiitake (a/a+b)  % 24.5% 25.8% 29.7% 31.0%  38.5% 
Total Supply (a+b)    99,551 100,810 105,613 102,139  109,281 
Average price of domestic 
Shiitake  yen/kg 1,079 1,041 980 949  915 
Number of farms    50,772 46,438 43,244 37,810  34,130 
Source: WTO (G/SG/N/7/JPN/1, G/SG/N/11/JPN/1, 25 April 2001) 
TABLE 3 
Results of the Investigation by the Government of Japan, Tatami Mats 
  Unit  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1,000 
sheets  11,369 8,628 10,344 13,569 20,300  Imports (a) 
% change    -24.1% 19.9% 31.2%  49.6% 
1,000 
sheets  26,937 25,088 21,302 15,923 13,872  Domestic production (b) 
% change    -6.9% -15.1% -25.3%  -12.9% 
Market share of imported 
Tatami (a/a+b)  % 29.7% 26.6% 32.7% 46.0%  59.4% 
Total Supply (a+b)    38,306 33,716 31,646 29,492  34,172 
Average price of domestic 
Tatami  yen/sheet 1,302 1,200 974 1,033  970 
Number of farms    4,416 4,106 3,582 2,817  2,244 




(i) Welsh onions 
While the average domestic price of Welsh onions in 2000 fell in comparison with the 1998 price, the 
average price for 1998 had sharply increased because of a bad crop due to the impact of typhoons.
19  
The 2000 price did not markedly decline (-11.9%) from the 1996 level. Domestic shipments almost 
leveled off from 1996, and shipments in 2000 actually rose over those in 1999. These facts leave the 
question open as to whether the domestic industries actually faced a “serious injury” as defined in the 
Agreement on Safeguards, or were in a state of “a significant overall impairment in the position of a 
domestic industry.”
20 
Moreover, statistics for import volumes used in the government’s investigations were only for 
“fresh or chilled Welsh onions,” which showed very large import increase rates of 362.4% for 1998 and 
211.6% for 1999. However, as Table 8 shows, the import increases are partially due to the fact that the 
“frozen Welsh onions” which accounted for over 90% of all imported Welsh onions in 1995 had 
gradually been displaced by “fresh or chilled Welsh onions.” But the government’s investigations made 
no mention of these facts. The imports of all Welsh onions, or imports of fresh or chilled Welsh onions 
combined with imports of frozen Welsh onions, showed more moderate rates of increase than the 
increases cited in the government’s investigations. 
TABLE 8 
Trends in Imports of “Fresh or Chilled Onion” and “Frozen Onion” 
  Unit  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
MT 475 1,505 1,475 6,807 21,278  37,411  Fresh or chilled 
onion (a)  % change  217.1% -2.0% 361.4% 212.6%  75.8% 
MT 5,253 3,953 5,545 4,703 8,454  185  Frozen onion (b) 
% change  -24.7% 40.3% -15.2% 79.7%  -97.8% 
MT 5,727 5,458 7,020 11,510 29,732  37,596  Total (a+b) 
% change  -4.7% 28.6% 64.0% 158.3%  26.5% 
Share of Frozen 
welsh onion 
(b/a+b) 
% 91.7% 72.4% 79.0% 40.9% 28.4%  0.5% 
                                                   
19 The  Nihon Keizai Shimbun, morning edition, p. 29, June 5, 1998. 




Source: Plant Protection Station, Statistics on plant quarantine. (http://www.pps.go.jp). 
Note: The number in the table above shows import volume of ex-quarantine. 
(ii) Shiitake mushrooms 
As for Shiitake mushrooms, there appears to be no apparent potential statistical problems. However, the 
rates of decline in domestic shipment volume in 2000 (-4.7% from 1999) and in the average domestic 
price (-3.6%) were not particularly large. Similar to the case of Welsh onions, it is open to question 
whether the domestic industry really faced a “serious injury” as defined in the Agreement. 
(iii) Tatami mats   
Out of the three products, the method and interpretation of the investigation for Tatami mats poses the 
biggest question. Firstly, as Kimura (2003) has pointed out, domestic shipments began to decline well 
before the sharp increase in imports. The total supply, or the combined volume of domestic shipments 
and imports had continued to decrease since 1996. When a decline in total supply and a decline in prices 
are applied in a simple partial equilibrium model, it seems highly likely that the decline in domestic 
shipment volumes stemmed partially or fully from the drop in domestic demand with a downward shift 
in the domestic demand curve.
21  Therefore, the possibility cannot entirely be ruled out that recognition 
of the injury as a result of the government’s investigation had deviated from the “non-attribution rule” of 
the Agreement on Safeguards to wit “when factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the 
domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports.”
22 
Furthermore, in the case of Tatami mats, a major scandal that shook the credibility of the 
government’s investigation came to light on November 15, after the completion of the provisional 
safeguard measures. The Ministry of Finance acknowledged that the trade statistics used in the 
government’s investigation were flawed.
23  Normally, Tatami mats should be classified as an item in 
                                                   
21  Kelly (1988, p. 192) and Irwin (2003, p. 19). 
22  Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.   




the category of “Products of plaiting materials of Igusa” (HS: 460191210). However, some customs 
offices prior to September 1999 classified and counted them as a separate item in the category of “Mats, 
matting and screens of Igusa” (HS: 460120010). All customs offices started following the correct 
classification beginning with the statistics for September 1999, but this resulted in a sharp increase in 
the apparent volume of Tatami mat imports from 1998 to 1999 (Table 9). The government used the 
inaccurate statistics in recognizing the “sharp increase in imports” and decided to implement the 
provisional safeguard measures. Although accurate statistics do not exist for the actual import volume of 
Tatami mats that should have been used in the investigation, when combining both import volumes of 
the two items miscategorized until 1999, the rate of increase in imports was actually negative for 1999 
and limited to 11.7% even for 2000. 
TABLE 9 
Statistical Impact of a Change in Commodity Classification in September 1999 
 
Products of plaiting 
materials of Igusa 
(a) 
Mats, matting and 
screens of Igusa 
(b) 
HS 460191210  460120010 
Total 
(a+b) 








change  ％ 
1995 23,471   14,687 38,158 61.5% 
1996 19,327 -17.7% 19,504 32.8% 38,831 1.8% 49.8% 
1997 14,668 -24.1% 19,862 1.8% 34,530 -11.1% 42.5% 
1998 17,584 19.9% 19,767 -0.5% 37,352 8.2% 47.1% 
1999 23,068 31.2%  14,215 -28.1% 37,282 -0.2% 61.9% 
2000 34,510 49.6%  7,149 -49.7% 41,659 11.7% 82.8% 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan Exports & Imports: Commodity by Country. 
c. China’s Retaliation on Imports from Japan and the Resolution of Conflict 
For each of the three products against which Japan implemented provisional safeguard measures, 
imports from China accounted for approximately 99% of the total in 2000.
24 The Chinese government 
                                                   
24 In 2000, China had an import market share of 99.0% for Welsh onions, 99/8% for Shiitake mushrooms, and 
99.9% for Tatami mats. The figure for Welsh onions is based on plant quarantine statistics (in terms of volume) of 




requested Japan to immediately remove the safeguard measures, insisting that: “Japan’s action of 
implementing the safeguard measures only against products for which China has high import shares 
while there were also other products whose imports sharply increased, is discriminatory and violates the 
basic principles of the WTO,” . . . “the stagnation of Japanese agriculture has been caused by the 
inefficient industrial structure and the lack of competitiveness,” and . . . “the investigation by the 
Japanese government is arbitrary and its causation analysis is insufficient.”
25 Subsequently, China 
invoked retaliatory measures on June 22, 2001 by imposing a special 100% custom duty on 
automobiles
26, air conditioners (excluding parts thereof), and mobile and car phones imported from 
Japan, leading to a major trade dispute between Japan and China. Incidentally, at the time of this trade 
friction, major Japan-China economic organizations were chaired by top executives of an automaker 
(Toyota Corporation) an air conditioner manufacturer (Toshiba Corporation) and a mobile telephone 
maker (Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.).
27  There is speculation that China intentionally targeted these 
products in its retaliation to induce Japan to withdraw the safeguard measures by effectively dividing 
public opinion in order to put pressure on the Japanese government. 
The Japanese government rebutted that “China’s retaliatory measures are in violation of both 
the principles of most-favored-nation treatment under the Japan-China Trade Agreement and dispute 
settlement rules of the WTO,” apparently creating an extremely tense trade situation. However, since 
Japan was faced with the approaching deadline of the investigation and expiration of the provisional 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the Ministry of Finance. 
25  The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, “Japan’s Safeguard Measures Violate WTO 
Rules,” the website of the Chinese Embassy in Japan (http://www.china-embassy.or.jp/jpn/14015.html). 
26  Passenger cars, buses, trucks, crane vehicles, and cement mixer trucks. 
27  At the time, the Japan-China Economic Association was headed by an executive adviser of Toshiba Corporation, 
the Japan-China Investment Promotion Organization by an honorary chairman of Toyota Motor Corporation, and 
the Japan-China Economic Relations and Trade Center by an executive adviser of Matsushita Electric Industrial 




safeguard measures in October, and China was nearing the date of the accession to the WTO, the two 
countries held numerous rounds of consultations, and finally reached an agreement on December 21 to 
settle the bilateral trade dispute. The agreements stipulated that: (1) Japan should avoid the 
implementation of the definitive safeguard measures; (2) China should suspend the retaliatory measures; 
and (3) a private-sector “Agricultural Products Trade Council” should be established in order to secure 
“orderly trade” between the two countries with the purpose of exchanging information on demand, the 
quality of products, production volumes and prices and also keeping track of production, demand and 
trade conditions.
28 While the purpose of the newly established council is not to control trade volume, 
but to “exchange information” among “private entities”, there is a possibility that this scheme violates 
Article 11 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which prohibits voluntary export restraint (VER), orderly 
marketing arrangements, or any other similar measures, since government officials are also participating 
in this council and promoting “orderly trade.”
29 
d. Adjustment Assistance Program for the Relevant Industries 
As noted above, one of the factors justifying the implementation of the safeguard measures is its 
function of providing a temporary period of time for affected domestic firms and workers to take the 
necessary measures within and between industries to prevent an undue increase in the costs of social 
adjustment costs. When the United States invokes safeguard measures under Section 201 of the Trade 
Act of 1974, it is common practice to correspondingly implement Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
programs also stipulated under the Act,
30, with the Department of Labor and the Department of 
                                                   
28  Cabinet Secretariat “Memorandum between Japan and China on Trade Friction regarding Agricultural Products 
(long onions (allium fistulosum), fresh shiitake mushrooms, and rushes for tatami mats)” 
(http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/1221memo_e.html) 
29 Lawfulness of “Agricultural Products Trade Council” is well analyzed, for example, in Kawase (2003, pp. 
530-31) and Nakagawa (2002, pp. 1032-33). 




Commerce providing adjustment assistance to workers and firms injured by increased imports. While 
Japan does not have a systematic trade adjustment assistance program, after the provisional safeguard 
measures were implemented in April 2001, the Subcommittee on Special Trade Measures of the 
Industrial Structure Council confirmed in its recommendation report that “definitive safeguard measures 
should be implemented concerning relevant products under the prospects that the adjustment of a 
domestic industry shall be carried out during a period of such implementation through the recovery of 
competitiveness by a domestic industry or in other forms.”
31 Following this report, the government 
provided in FY2002 a budget for structural adjustment measures,
32 including 65 billion yen for Welsh 
onions and other vegetables, 2.3 billion yen for Shiitake mushrooms, and 1.0 billion yen for Tatami mats. 
It should be noted, however, that all these measures aimed to promote adjustment within related 
domestic industries, and not to encourage the shift of factors of production between industries. 
4. EVALUATION 
In light of the developments reviewed so far, this section attempts to evaluate the provisional safeguard 
measures that Japan implemented in 2001 from several viewpoints. 
a. Efficiency (Minimization of Social Adjustment Costs) 
The following points can be stipulated for evaluation from the standpoint of efficiency. If the basic 
principle is upheld that the first-best policy to encourage adjustments is to directly offset market failures 
hampering adjustments, then the implementation of safeguards that would weaken the welfare of 
                                                   
31 Subcommittee on Special Trade Measures, Industrial Structure Council, “An Approach to Safeguard Measures 
(May 9, 2001)” (http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/safeguard/data/SG_sankōushin.pdf). 
32 The combined sum of budgets is calculated on the basis of materials provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (“Structural Reform Measures for Vegetables,” “Structural Reform Measures for Shiitake 
Mushrooms,” and “Structural Reform Measures for Igusa and Tatami Mats”) for submission to the Council on 





consumers through higher prices of imports is undesirable, even if intended as provisional measures. 
Even when theoretically there is room to justify the prevention of an undue increase in social 
adjustment costs by the implementation of safeguard measures, it is questionable if, due to the 
provisional nature of the measures, the benefit of minimizing the social adjustment costs actually 
exceeds the negative impact of the safeguard measures in such a short period of 200 days. Rather, it may 
even be possible that the provisional safeguard measures to help relevant industries may raise excessive 
expectations of receiving continued protection, consequently delaying the needed adjustments. In this 
connection, agricultural producers gathered in the capital of Tokyo for several months until trade 
disputes with China were settled, in order to engage in massive rent-seeking activities asking for 
implementation of the definitive safeguard measures.
33 
China’s retaliation inflicted large losses on Japan’s export industries. Table 10 shows monthly 
figures of Japan’s exports to China of mobile and car phones, air conditioners and automobiles in 2001. 
In the exports of these products to China, there is a difference of over 50 billion yen between the exports 
before and after China launched the retaliatory measures on June 22. While this difference cannot be 
defined as the cost of China’s retaliation since it does not consider seasonal fluctuation factors, the rapid 
growth trend of the Chinese economy, and other demand-side factors, there is no doubt that the 
retaliation brought a large loss for Japan.   
                                                   
33  It is likely that the provisional safeguard measures helped to increase expectations for protection among entities 
other than those engaged in production of the three items subject to the provisional measures. For example, 
according to a questionnaire survey conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, a total of 
1,395 local governments submitted comments seeking the implementation of safeguard measures in 2001 alone. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, “The Number of Comments Concerning the Implementation of 






Japan’s Exports of Mobile Telephones, Air Conditioners, and Automobiles to China in 2001 











Year 2001  Unit: Thousand JPY 
Jan. 1,125,925 63,299 5,719,831  6,909,055
Feb. 2,339,436 131,536 4,872,967  7,343,939
Mar. 2,404,506 360,249 7,876,606  10,641,361
Apr. 3,811,215 190,625 9,425,315  13,427,155
May. 2,747,747 156,921 10,669,227  13,573,895
Jun. 2,098,572 113,259 8,955,692  11,167,523
Jul. 902 55,289 2,477,262  2,533,453
Aug. 4,846 69,620 1,575,572  1,650,038
Sep. 836 133,773 3,168,324  3,302,933
Oct. 425 88,548 794,490  883,463
Nov. 32,023 47,037 1,160,053  1,239,113
Dec. 5,014 51,089 2,484,721  2,540,824
   
Jan. to Jun. (a)    14,527,401 1,015,889 47,519,638  63,062,928
July to Dec. (b)    44,046 445,356 11,660,422  12,149,824
(a - b)  14,483,355 570,533 35,859,216  50,913,104
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan Exports & Imports: Commodity by Country. 
Note: HS codes corresponding to the respective product above are following. Mobile and car phones: 
852520500 and 852520600, Air conditioning machines (other than parts): 8415 minus 841590, 
Motorcars: 8703, Buses: 8702, Trucks: 8704, Crane lorries: 870510, Concrete-mixer lorries: 870540.   
b. Political Safety Valve Hypothesis 
Did the chain of events surrounding safeguard measures serve as a “political safety valve” to mitigate 
the pressures for protective trade measures? I do not believe that domestic industries competing with 
imports appreciated the effectiveness of the safeguard rules through the implementation of the 
provisional safeguard measures. Rather, it is assumed that the people who had clamored for the 
protection from imports realized the user-unfriendliness of such a safeguard tool as well as a sense of 
futility over Japan’s eventual failure to implement the definitive safeguard measures. As a result of the 
spreading recognition among domestic industries competing with imports that safeguard measures are 
not something that can be readily implemented, the possibility cannot be denied that pressures opposing 




may intensify in some industries in the future.   
On the other hand, it is true that the recent chain of events and the extensive media coverage 
provided a majority of the Japanese people who previously took little interest in trade issues with an 
opportunity to realize and think about the costs of trade protectionism and potential risks of retaliation 
by trading partners (Table 11). It may very well be that the biggest gain for Japan from this case is that 
the silent majority, in other words, the true beneficiaries of free trade had an opportunity to think 
seriously about trade issues. 
TABLE 11 
Number of Articles Relating Safeguards in Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
71 58 22 18 20 57  105
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
51 15 25 41 551 482  252
Source: Author’s calculation using Nikkei Telecom 21 (http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/). 
c. Public Choice Perspective 
As previously mentioned, among the factors that influenced the decision to implement the provisional 
safeguard measures was the election of the House of Representatives scheduled to take place about half 
a year after the initiation of the safeguard investigations. The Research Commission on Trade in 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Products of the Liberal Democratic Party, which relies on votes by 
farmers, was clearly the driving force behind the implementation of the provisional measures. 
Nevertheless, Japan ultimately did not implement the definitive measures, possibly for the following 
reasons. First, the cost of trade retaliation by China and the foreign policy cost of the deteriorated ties 
with China were simply too large to bear. Second, the Upper House election was over by the time the 
agreement was made to avoid the definitive safeguard measures, and on top of this, the Koizumi Cabinet 
which was enjoying high popularity in urban constituencies by upholding the theme of “structural 
reform,” had a payoff structure quite different from that of the previous cabinets.
34  
                                                   




As indicated in Table 2, the number of safeguard measures internationally implemented is quite 
limited relative to the numbers of anti-dumping measures or countervailing duties. The reasons for this 
may be that the administrative cost of investigations is large, and that WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body adhere to the strict interpretation of the WTO agreements in examining the conditions for 
implementing safeguard measures, and have so far found in all the dispute settlement cases brought 
involving countries that invoked the safeguard measures that the safeguard actions taken were WTO- 
inconsistent.
35 Thus, that safeguard measures are not a user-friendly tool may increase the future 
political risks confronting politicians who are backed by industries competing with imports. If the recent 
series of events helped Japanese politicians to recognize that safeguard measures are a difficult tool to 
handle, it would mean nothing less than a decline in an important function of “lessening the political 
risk in trade liberalization policy” that safeguard measures are supposed to have.
36 It can be argued 
therefore that it is imperative to consider measures that complement or substitute for safeguard measures 
as Japan continues further to promote freer trade.   
5. CONCLUSION: FUTURE POLICY OPTIONS FOR JAPAN 
Safeguard measures used to be considered a useful tool to strike a balance between the promotion of 
freer trade and responses to domestic political demands for trade protection. However, given retaliation 
risks and rigid conditions for the justification of safeguard measures established in the WTO disputes 
settlement cases, it would be unrealistic for most WTO member countries to expect the flexible 
implementation of WTO-consistent safeguard measures. Therefore, Japan is likely to find itself in a 
“trilemma” situation in which it cannot simultaneously resolve the problems of “promotion of trade 
liberalization,” “strict administration of safeguard measures,” and “responses to domestic political 
                                                   
35  Suzuki (2003, pp. 94-95). 
36 Kawase (2003), provides a detailed discussion of the political function of safeguard measures and the 






Trade adjustment assistance (TAA) programs may have potential as a means of breaking 
through the Japanese trilemma just identified. In the United States, the necessity of TAA programs for 
firms and workers injured by increased imports was first recognized in 1954, and such programs were 
subsequently institutionalized in 1962.
38  In recent years, these programs have been adopted not only to 
complement safeguard measures but also they are utilized frequently as a stand-alone replacement for 
safeguard measures. Like safeguard measures, TAA programs that provide generous assistance to firms 
and workers injured particularly by increased imports have been subjected to a barrage of criticisms 
from the perspectives of efficiency and equity. At the same time however, these programs are valued for 
their perceived “political function” of mitigating pressure for protection and ensuring latitude in trade 
policy.
39 Moreover, in comparison with safeguard measures, TAA programs are known to have 
advantages. They can: directly influence market failures hampering adjustments without deteriorating 
consumer welfare; can provide support to individual firms and workers in accordance with the extent of 
damage; face little risk of retaliation by trading partners; and do not carry the risk of WTO disputes over 
the legitimacy of their implementation. 
Since Japan does not have institutionalized TAA programs, it has so far responded ex post facto 
under ad hoc budgets, as seen in measures related to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture”
40 
implemented after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations and Structural adjustment-related 
measures taken after the recent implementation of the provisional safeguard measures. However, in 
comparison with the U.S. system, several problems can be pointed out with the existing methods of such 
                                                   
37 Kuno  (2004). 
38  Jackson et al. (1995, p. 661). 
39  See Richardson (1982), Aho and Bayard (1984); and Schoepfle (2000). 






41 First, for TAA programs to function properly as a means to complement and 
substitute for safeguard measures, laws and regulations as well as procedures are necessary for injured 
industries, firms, and workers to apply for assistance in a fair manner. However, such a system does not 
exist in Japan, so that there is no established standard of procedures or qualifications for screening 
recipients. Instead, such determination is made through an extremely opaque and political process. It 
appears that industries provided with assistance programs are selected with political considerations. 
While this may be the price that has to be paid for trade liberalization, recklessly spending taxpayers’ 
money for TAA programs in total absence of a qualification or screening process should be recognized 
as a serious problem. Moreover, most of the assistance programs in Japan aim at recovering the 
competitiveness of an injured domestic industry as a whole and do not aim at promoting inter-industry 
adjustments for individual workers and firms. As a country that achieved economic growth by enjoying 
the benefits of freer trade, Japan should seek to break through the trilemma situation by considering the 
introduction of well-institutionalized trade adjustment assistance programs. 
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